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Book Review: George P. Smith, I's
Law and Bioethics-Intersections along the
Mortal Coil
THE HON. MICHAEL KIRBY AC CMG
I
Professor George P. Smith is an alumnus of Indiana University. He
has taught medical law and ethics in universities in the United States,
Britain, Australia, and many other countries. His upbringing in Indiana
has kept his feet firmly planted on the ground. In a field of discourse
where it is easy to get carried away with theory and speculation,
Professor Smith has based his analysis, ultimately, on the wisdom of
ordinary folks.
This is not to say that he is uninterested in, or unaware of, the
philosophical, theological, and theoretical writings relevant to his
chosen topics. This new book is replete with evidence of his deep
research into the writings of great scholars in the fields of law,
economics, political science, philosophy, and theology. However, he is
not content with purely formalistic and verbal analysis of the
quandaries presented to humanity by advances in biological knowledge
and connected technologies. In his chosen field, above all, there are
human beings who are disabled, disadvantaged, sick, and dying at the
end of the discourse. For Professor Smith, this basic reality demands,
ultimately, a principled but compassionate stance on the acute problems
with which he has been struggling for over nearly four decades of his
professional life. This book of essays is the latest in a series of
impressive monographs, articles, and other contributions that explore
the puzzling problems of medical law and its insistent stimulus by "The
New Biology."
The book is divided into eight chapters. Gradually, the chapters
take the reader through a journey of the mind that explores
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contemporary bioethical challenges. The book searches for stable and
reliable criteria to tackle and answer these challenges. It embraces as
highly relevant and helpful the universal principles of human rights
that have emerged since Eleanor Roosevelt's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR).l It then concludes with a number of specific
chapters on particular problems. The last of these chapters focuses on
aspects of death and dying and explores the ultimate puzzle of human
consciousness and existence: the end. It does this from the standpoint of
the added dilemmas that are presented to us by modern life-saving
technology.
For those who are searching for simple, cut-and-dried solutions to
the problems of medical law and bioethics, this book will be a
disappointment. It does not gloss over the problems, uncertainties, and
legitimate differences that exist in this area of discourse. Professor
Smith's considerable mind, now enriched with vast experience in his
field, disdains such simplicities as unworthy of the human moral sense
and incompatible with the complexities of contemporary biotechnology.
In this respect, early grounding in the highly practical attitudes and
approaches of the common law comes to his aid.
In the common law, there is never, ultimately, a lacuna in the law.
If there is a gap, unfilled by the norms of a national or subnational
constitution; untouched by federal, state, or other legislation; and upon
which the common law is silent, judges have the authority and duty to
fill the gap. They do so by applying logic and analogy to any relevant
legal principles. They use their common sense and their perception of
justice to impose a legal solution that best fits a detailed understanding
of the facts. It is because the facts relevant to decisions on medical law
are constantly changing, in terms of human knowledge in basic biology
and human acquaintance with new technology, that medical law and
bioethics are so disputed and contested. Different observers simply see
different facts or regard different principles as relevant to those facts.
Professor Smith has written his latest book to untangle some of the
ensuing debates.
II
The first chapter is an introduction and overview. It begins
dramatically enough with what the author calls "synthetic biology."
Synthetic biology is the development of new life forms by human
intervention. One particularly tantalizing development is a "synthetic
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
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cell" controlled entirely by a bacterial genome. Dr. J. Craig Venter
boldly claims this is "the first self-replicating species we've had on the
planet whose parent is a computer."2 With inventions at this level of
originality, it is little wonder that new and completely unexplored
problems are presenting for bioethicists and lawmakers. In order to
provide appropriate bearings, Professor Smith invokes the basic norms
that were included in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights (Bioethics Declaration) (2005),3 the UNESCO
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003),4 and the
UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights (1998).5
As Professor Smith points out, these instruments are not binding
international treaties. In that sense, they do not afford a strictly legal
foundation for analysis. They are more analogous to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which was nonetheless extremely
influential in its appeal to the moral sensibilities of humanity. V.I.
Lenin, once general-secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, declared that the person who writes the minutes of an
organization ends up controlling it. To some extent, the same can be
said of the UNESCO Declarations. By the power of collective human
wisdom encapsulated in these instruments (and in default of other
equivalent and competing statements of universal status), these
documents have begun to chart the way ahead, at least until something
better is devised. An important contribution of this book is the way
Professor Smith weaves the themes of the UNESCO Declarations into
the larger dialogue about global human rights and the way he then
invokes the principles in these instruments to suggest solutions to some
of the puzzling ethical and legal dilemmas the new technology presents.
2. Nicholas Wade, Researchers Say They Created a 'Synthetic Cell', N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/201O/O5/21/science/21cell.html.
3. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION: SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/bioethics-and-
human-rights/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
4. International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION: SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/human-
genetic-data/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
5. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION: SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/human-
genome-and-human-rights/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
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Professor Smith asserts, as is self-evident, that human actors have
to realize that ethical, socio-legal, economic, and medical conflicts are
now being presented to national governments and international
organizations in ever increasing number. How, in these circumstances,
can "collective decisions" be made that represent a viable foundation for
rational and democratically approved law?
Professor Smith analyzes differing approaches to the resolution of
these issues. They range from the invocation of religious principles,
through concepts of distributive justice to the invocation, and use of the
broad concepts of universal human rights. Towards the close of the
introductory chapter, he identifies the fundamental purpose of his book:
The central question presented in this book is, thus: how
do bioethics, public health, and human rights law unite
to provide a framework for rational decision-making at
the legislative, judicial, executive, administrative, and
clinical points of health care service and-thus-thereby
seek to validate and safeguard the claim that all citizens
are to be respected as autonomous individuals, be
treated with beneficence and without non-malfeasance
or undue risk or with harm, and have a fair opportunity
to receive the benefits of medical resource allocations? 6
I take his passage to be concerned with promoting beneficence,
avoiding malfeasance, and avoiding undue risk or harm to the
individual and the community. The author makes it clear that the
search for ethical solutions is designed to afford "quality assurance" in
the delivery of health care resources. The search looks at individual
cases, but it extrapolates from the individual cases to how they operate
generally. The objective, as Professor Smith puts it, is to afford "an
appreciation of and sensitivity to the complexity of the whole process of
informed decision-making, as well as a framework for reaching
principled yet practical, rational judgments and for determining health
policies."7
It is in the search for "principled judgments" that Professor Smith
reveals himself as a respected theoretician and conceptualist. But, it is
in the search for "practical, rational judgments" that he manifests both
his early "Hoosier" origins and his workable legal objectives.8 Bioethics
is no doubt a worthy profession, but a bioethicist who is concerned with
6. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, LAW AND BIOETHICS: INTERSECTIONS ALONG THE MORTAL
COIL 10 (2012).
7. Id. at 11.
8. Id.
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the manifestation of broad principles in the form of law must have a
practical and rational approach. Nothing else is likely to survive the
scrutiny of judges, politicians, and administrators who operate in the
real world. Unless this approach is adopted, it is likely that the real
world operations will see the problems as too difficult and put the
problems aside while other, easier questions are addressed in the
limited available attention span of the community and lawmaking
representatives.
III
The second chapter addresses the setting of acceptable parameters
for bioethical challenges. This chapter too begins with the story of a
dramatic scientific development. In November 2007, a group of Oregon
scientists announced that they had not only created, but also harvested,
stem cells from fully-formed monkey embryos that were created from a
skin cell of a single monkey, This demonstrated that primates were
biologically capable of being cloned.
Scientists immediately expressed concern as to whether the
biological technique could be applied to human beings. Cloning of the
human species has been a controversial topic in ethical and legal
discourse over the past twenty years, accompanying the scientific
advances that appeared to make the technique feasible in humans. Put
broadly, most (but by no means all) ethical studies have been prepared
to countenance the advance of cloning techniques for therapeutic (e.g.
drug development and treatment) purposes but not for reproductive (e.g.
entire human copy) objectives.
Bearing out this generality, Professor Smith describes the
controversies that have emerged in the United States concerning stem
cell research during the successive administrations of Presidents George
W. Bush and Barack Obama. The latter condoned scientific research for
therapeutic purposes. The Obama Administration approved new lines of
human embryonic stem cells for research and experimentation with
seventy-six stem cell lines presently approved and more planned for
later approval. However, the liberalization by the Obama
Administration ran into practical and ethical controversies because
millions of dollars had been spent on the original twenty-one stem cell
lines authorized for use by President George W. Bush. To many
outsiders, this appeared to be an unstable posture. Either stem cell use
was unethical of itself and should be prohibited altogether, or stems
cells should be seen as simply another pluripotent human tissue
available for all the scientific experimentation and speculation.
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Professor Smith describes the controversies in U.S. courts
concerning the use of stem cells, having regard to the state of
congressional legislation. Ultimately, he turns from this unsatisfying
speculation to an analysis of the generic problem at hand by referring to
what he calls the 'three foundational principles' of bioethics: autonomy
(self-determination), beneficence, and justice.
Against this background, Professor Smith poses the basic question:
how can a participatory democracy resolve such issues? He predicts that
bioethics will continue to evolve and will defy any permanent resolution
of its dilemmas. Issues surrounding abortion, the use of assisted
reproductive technology, and the beginning and end of life will "continue
to change."9 Reconciling the form of lawmaking in a complex modern
democracy, with the countless puzzling dilemmas presented by science
and technology, is a challenge. And, according to Smith, the major
challenge of contemporary bioethics is "to express complex arguments in
a way comprehensible to a broad public."10
Of course, this is easier said than done. It requires a "new
thoughtful and questioning attitude."1 1 At least in a democratic
community, scientific discovery cannot be allowed a completely free
rein. Still, unless bioethicists can engage the public and explain their
dilemmas, the problems arising will be "just too painful, technical,
complicated, sensitive and controversial for our institutions of
government."'12 This instrumental quandary is one that this current
reviewer has likewise examined over the past thirty years. Adapting the
willingness and capacity of our lawmaking institutions to address and
resolve the new dilemmas is a painful challenge. It is one by no means
certain of success. However, the dangers inherent in the failure of
democratic lawmaking to adapt to the complexities of the current age
are now starkly revealed. Either our governmental mechanisms will
capitulate and thereby surrender to whatever the clever scientists like
Craig Venter and his colleagues decide to undertake. Or under populist
pressures of noisy, opinionated groups who want to "ban" experiments
(usually in the name of religious beliefs), an impasse will be reached
that involves serious opportunity costs for potentially beneficial, even
lifesaving, experiments. These experiments will then simply move off
shore to laboratories and countries, operating under different cultures
and laws, which do not see any relevant moral impediment but only the
relief of suffering and substantial profits.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Id. at 26.
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id.
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IV
This conclusion presents a timely jumping-off point to the third
chapter dealing with law, religion, and medical science. This chapter
begins with a reminder of the many circumstances, old and new, where
those of particular religious beliefs have invoked the courts and other
lawmakers in the hope of securing legal support to impose their beliefs
on the entire community.
Professor Smith instances cases involving the placement of the Ten
Commandments of the Hebrew Bible in public buildings in the United
States and the efforts of President Jacques Chirac in France to ban
overt religious symbols from all public institutions. Somewhere between
the strongly religious and strictly secular attitudes in society lies the
space where most modern democracies frame their law. In countries like
the United States, Britain, and Australia, there is no getting away from
the cultural power of Judeo-Christian traditions and morality. By the
same token, there is often a reaction, sometimes sustained by
constitutional texts and doctrine, against simplistic attempts to convert
disputable religious convictions into positive law. Nowhere is this more
true than in the puzzling new dilemmas of bioethics.
Professor Smith attempts to define a middle ground with an
aphorism: "Without religion law degenerates into little more than a
mechanical legalism; and religion without law loses its social
effectiveness." Nevertheless, perfectly law-abiding states have survived
by adopting, and enforcing, strong principles of secularism. The
ordinary experience of life for most teaches us that many of the most
moral people that we know (using that word in a general sense) are
secular humanists. The recent experiences of humanity and displays of
fanatical religious intolerance risk giving religious morality a bad name.
Professor Smith grapples in the U.S. context, with a paradox that
"the majority of the citizens believe themselves obligated by a prior
divine morality despite the fact that most of them are unable to argue
for it theoretically."13 He examines the notion of humanism and the
Darwinian thesis of evolution and its impact on creationism. In an
extended section, he addresses classifications and caveats issued in
successive encyclicals by Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI, Pope
Emeritus.
There is one matter of delicacy in this section of the book that I
cannot forebear mentioning. It is Professor Smith's description of the
Popes as "Holy Father." I suspect that this description derives from the
fact that the chapter first saw the light of day as a contribution to an
13. Id. at 45.
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ethical discourse in a Roman Catholic institution. Professor Smith's day
job, after all, is as a long-term scholar and teacher at the Columbus
School of Law of the Catholic University of America in Washington DC.
Although he is not himself a Roman Catholic, Professor Smith's native
politeness might make it occasionally prudent to assign the deferential
religious title to the Pope as reproduced in this chapter. His university
is not only Catholic, but also pontifical in its foundational charter.
Nevertheless, in a text which is otherwise scrupulously impartial
and universal in outlook (and ultimately embraces principles adopted by
the relevant secular international agency of the United Nations,
UNESCO), references to the Pope as "Holy Father" grate, at least on
this reviewer. Holiness is an accepted honorific. But "Holy Father,"
repeatedly used, is a bow too far. Because of the large number of
adherents to the Roman Catholic denomination of Christianity, the
expressed views on morality, as relevant to bioethics, of that church's
leaders are clearly relevant and appropriate for academic study and
examination in the context of this book. However, it might have been
better if it had been undertaken without words of religious deference
that hint at the assignment at a semidivine status to the Pope's
opinions. Test it this way: how would we feel if similar words of
deference were applied to the Mufti of Cairo? Or to a venerable religious
figure of Hinduism?
Papal encyclicals are famous for their obscurity. 14 The most
notorious instances can be found in those by Pope Pius XII during the
Second World War, which did not explicitly, and in plain terms,
condemn by name the genocide of the Jews and other minorities.
Professor Smith describes the endeavours of Pope John Paul II to "chart
a middle position between the creationists and the evolutionists .. .
foster[ing] not only dialogue but openness to truth."'15 However, Pope
Benedict XVI is also recorded as expressing his unhappiness with
evolutionary science, which he claimed seeks to discount "creative
reason... which has created everything, without a form of supernatural
guidance."1 6 The most that can be allowed, according to the Pope
Emeritus's approach, is "the possibility that the creator used evolution
as a tool. v17 Many readers, however, will continue to question why it is
necessary or self-evident to interpose a "creator" at all. Pity the poor
14. See Colin Tatz, Naughts and Crosses: The Silence of the Churches in the Holocaust
Years, in GENOCIDE PERSPECTIVES IV: ESSAYS ON HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE 166, 170,
177-80 (Colin Tatz ed., 2012), available at http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/scholarly-
works/bitstream/handle/2100/1349/GenocidePerspectiveslV_Tatz.pdf?sequence= l.
15. SMITH, supra note 6, at 47.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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author of a book on contemporary bioethics who must address all
relevant audiences at once.
Evidence of the power and influence in the United States of the
contemporary movement that embraces intelligent design appears in an
extended discussion in the book of the role of an intelligent agent (not
necessarily using the word God) which has guided the history of the
Earth and its surrounding universe. Creationists believe that the Bible
is true, inerrant, and infallible, affording both a necessary and sufficient
set of rules by which to resolve contemporary bioethical problems. This
section of Professor Smith's analysis takes the reader through the many
court decisions in which religious (creationist) groups have battled with
educationalists and secularists (evolutionists) over the teaching of
evolution and creation in United States public schools. Whilst these
cases and their resolution are obviously important for the mindset of a
population that has the responsibility of making bioethical decisions of
profound significance for the entire world, it is probably fair to say that
no such debate or court case could likely arise in any other western
country. Doubtless, similar issues might have to be decided by the
courts in Islamic, Jewish, and other communities. Still, this is an exotic
insight into Americana that Professor Smith recounts in an admirably
dry, restrained, and factual way.
In the end, as he concludes, it is organized religion that is mainly
presented with serious challenges by the new biology. At least some of
the concerns of religion involve explaining the problem of suffering and
supporting the alleviation and prevention of suffering. This is
comparatively easy for medical scientists and physicians, as Professor
Smith points out, because their mission is generally to attempt to cure
or relieve pain. To this extent, the purposes of religion and medical
science are substantially the same: to minimize or alleviate suffering.
However, where biotechnology presents the possibility of human
cloning, religion becomes anxious that man is presuming upon the sole
prerogative of God as the creator of all living things. Still, where
cloning, at least of the therapeutic variety, might reduce pain and
suffering and open up the potential of hugely beneficial treatments and
cures, religion faces a challenge. It does not always resolve that
challenge quickly, easily, or persuasively.
The same can be said of condoms and HIV. How easy it would be for
the churches to draw a distinction between the use of condoms solely to
permit promiscuous sexual activity outside marriage or to prevent the
risk of passing HIV to others or oneself? In this purpose might be found
a simple solution to an acute moral dilemma. Yet by embracing a moral
absolute and forbidding condom use altogether in the midst of the AIDS
pandemic, religions are made to appear insensitive to human problems,
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disjoined from reality, and indifferent to the huge toll of death and
suffering. Professor Smith, once he passed beyond his polite deference to
the "Holy Father," might have made this point a little more
emphatically and critically. It is the absolutism of organized religion
(rather than of the evolutionists) that has partly played religious
institutions out of a leading role in contemporary technological
bioethics. This is the reason why the universal principles of human
rights, as elaborated by the recent UNESCO Declarations, have now
entered the field to fill the gap.
V
Thus begins the fourth chapter of Professor Smith's book. It is
concerned with "Human Rights, Health Care and Bioethics." This is a
natural step in his argument. From the limited and sometimes negative
role of religion in contemporary bioethics, we move to a new plain
comprised of the modern manifestations of natural law theories. This is
a level of discourse that can be traced, as Professor Smith demonstrates,
to the English Magna Carta of 1215,18 the English Bill of Rights of
1689,19 the U.S. Declaration of Independence of 1776,20 and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.21 Whilst the
importance of the earlier progenitors is acknowledged, the high
significance of the French Declaration is properly recognized in
Professor Smith's analysis. The French Declaration led eventually to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and to the
subsequent treaties, including, most especially, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).22
The brilliance of Eleanor Roosevelt's UDHR can be seen in the way
it embraces not just civil and political rights (the usual business of
Western civil rights), but also the deeper and broader notions of
economic, social, and cultural rights, including, most critically, the right
of access to the best available health care. It is the elaboration of these
18. MAGNA CARTA (Eng. 1215).
19. English Bill of Rights 1689, THE AVALON PROJECT, YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://avalon.law.yale.eduI17th-century/england.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
20. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
21. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (Fr. 1789).
22. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNHCR, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36cO.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNHCR, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aaO.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
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notions of that has led to problems of justiciability and attempts to
detail humanity's health care concerns in the modern era.
When the United Nations needed to perform this elaboration, it
turned to the UNESCO, created in 1948, as its intellectual think tank.
Most of the balance of this chapter is addressed to the three UNESCO
Declarations named at the opening of this review. Transparency
requires this reviewer to acknowledge not only a long time association
with UNESCO and its general conferences, but also participation in
that body's International Bioethics Committee (IBC) and, specifically, in
the drafting group established by the IBC to prepare the most
significant of the named Declarations, namely the Universal Declaration
on Bioethics and Human Rights.23 This was adopted by the member
states of UNESCO at its general conference in October 2005 without
dissent.
Professor Smith describes the way this Bioethics Declaration seeks
to marry the basic principles of the traditional discourse on bioethics
with the emerging principles of universal human rights that have grown
out of the UDHR. Correctly, he acknowledges a number of uncertainties
in the language used in the Bioethics Declaration. He accepts that the
so-called "right to health" in international law involves a duty of
imperfect obligation.24 As yet, it is not one that is universally and
individually enforceable for obvious practical and economic reasons. It is
contestable, but it is certainly making headway and beneficial
circumstances have helped it along.
Professor Smith's analysis performs a service to a U.S. audience by
drawing these international developments to a wider attention. Until
lately, the United States has largely rejected a communitarian approach
to a "right to health," being one of the few developed countries without a
general, national, publicly-funded health care system. It is this fact that
causes Professor Smith to conclude that "[i]n point of fact, the United
States may be seen as probably violating the right to health-surely not
because it spends too little on health care and public health, but rather
because its resources are distributed inequitably."25 The adjustment to
this type of ethical thinking may, in the future, derive some stimulus
from the international discourse on the subject, including the UNESCO
Bioethics Declaration described in this book.
23. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, supra note 3.
24. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25, G.A. Res. 217 (1II) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to . . . medical care ...");
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966,
993U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health").
25. SMITH, supra note 6, at 80.
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At the very end of his analysis, Professor Smith suggests that "the
self-defeating enforcement structure of the United Nations instruments
derives from their reliance on a voluntary system of compliance and
self-policing efforts by individual states."26 There is a lot of truth in this
conclusion. However, it may understate the gradual way in which ideas,
propounded as universal, can come to influence the thinking of
humanity. The UDHR, largely an American idea insisted upon at the
birth of the United Nations, has come to play an extremely important
role in the development of an ideology for humanity and expectations on
the part of disadvantaged people everywhere. Moreover, although
imperfect in content and enforcement, the United Nations' machinery
does provide some supervisory and monitoring enforcement
mechanisms. Thus, the United Nations Human Right Council has
appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health. Presently, this
is Mr. Anand Grover, a senior Indian advocate with great experience in
the global response to HIV/AIDS.27 He enjoys competence, as does the
Human Rights Council, to examine member states' compliance with the
universal principles to which the United Nations adheres. The United
Nation's universal principles proclaim a universal principle relating to
health care.
The road ahead is long and, as Professor Smith says, "uncertain."
But at least the journey has begun. Measured against the millennia of
neglect, progress has certainly been made. Lawyers and bioethicists now
have broad statements of principle, adopted by the United Nations, to
afford some guidance. The influence of these statements is likely to
expand as awareness is enlarged. This is why Professor Smith's book is
a useful and timely contribution to the project.
VI
The succeeding chapters of the book may be dealt with more briefly.
They tackle particular instances of bioethical and biolegal concerns.
They do so with the benefit of the preceding discourse on matters of
history, religion, law, economics, principle, politics, and international
declarations.
Chapter five is concerned with allocating health care resources. This
examination is written against the background of the British and other
26. Id. at 82.
27. See Mr. Anand Grover: Special Rapporteur on The Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Health/Pages/SRBio.aspx (last visited Mar. 17,
2013).
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health care systems and the adoption in the United States of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, introduced by the administration of
President Barack Obama. 28 As Professor Smith notes, "a very public
conversation is being conducted throughout the nation on this issue."29
As a result of the re-election of President Obama for a second term in
November 2012, the health care system known as Obamacare appears
assured to be upheld by the Supreme Court and endorsed by the
majority of the people in the democratic process.
Professor Smith offers useful commentaries upon issues of
intergenerational justice in the matter of health care; gate-keeping
issues; and the controversies of resource allocation. These large
questions are necessarily addressed in all advanced countries. For most
foreigners, the fact that these questions present difficult quandaries,
large issues of controversy, and perplexing puzzles is not a reason for
failing to provide a universal publicly-funded health care system.
Chapter six also addresses public health emergencies. Many recent
occasions illustrate the successive crises that need to be tackled by any
modern state recognizing, as Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United
States Supreme Court once vividly put it, "[t]here is danger that, if the
Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical
wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide
pact."30
The chapter looks at a range of national crises, including the
responses to HIV/AIDS, responses to the disaster in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, and the challenges presented by the avian flu H5N1
virus. Self evidently, challenges of this kind summon up the vital role of
modern government to protect and sustain the people in circumstances
of unexpected disasters. Obviously, a triage principle must be invoked to
ensure an adequate response whilst maintaining the other, and
sometimes competing, activities of government. As HIV and the avian
flu instances demonstrate, at the outset of public dangers of this kind
there will often be a terrifying uncertainty about the nature and extent
of the challenge. It is at such moments that community leadership is
vital and only slightly less important than having trusted mechanisms
in place and people that can make informed choices and guide
democratic leaders.
The seventh chapter on autonomy, decisional capacity, and
"informed consent," tackles a foundational principle of medical bioethics,
28. 42 U.S.C. § 18000 (2010); Health Care And Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
29. SMITH, supra note 6, at 100.
30. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
518 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1
which is also reflected in the UNESCO Bioethics Declaration. In all
western countries, there is a large developed jurisprudence on the
meaning and application of informed consent to medical treatment.
Given the enlargement of public education and the ongoing character of
technology-enhanced treatment, even the content of informed consent
has changed in recent times. Whereas once it involved a single decision
by a patient to surrender all subsequent choices and decisions to
medical staff, today the notion usually involves ongoing dialogue that is
continuously respectful of patient autonomy. The belief that "nanny
knows best" is not as fashionable now in the law as once it was. Yet,
involving patients and their families in difficult and painful decisions,
particularly at the end of life, adds to the stress of decision-making and
time taken in decision-making, which once could effectively have been
left to the doctors concerned.
Finally, Professor Smith offers an eighth chapter on "An Easeful or
Troubling Death." He presents these adjectives as alternatives. And as
usual, he opens the chapter with a surprise. Opinion poll surveys
appear to indicate that significant numbers of U.S. citizens find
medically-assisted suicide to be morally acceptable and indeed part of
the inherent moral right that citizens enjoy "to end their lives if they are
in great pain with no hope of improvement." 31
Professor Smith is one of the foremost experts in examining this
troublesome area of discourse. For many years he has been thinking and
writing about it. His chapter on it for this book is a masterful
examination of themes that he has explored elsewhere. In a sense, it
represents a distillation of his thinking, a kind of pure essence of the
ongoing dialogue that most developed societies have concerning end of
life decisions.
The dialogue arises out of the simple fact that modern medicine and
medical technology ensure that increasing numbers of us live into very
old age, surviving childhood and midlife illnesses that once would have
carried off most of the population. With the growing lifespan have come
increased instances of dementia, Alzheimer's Disease, and other
long-term disabilities that place enormous demands on personal and
national budgets for patient care and maintenance. Obviously, brutal
termination of the lives of the old and frail is not an option compatible
with national law or universal human rights. But when does a duty
arise not to administer futile treatment? When does the pain relieving
advantage of palliative care merge into a known and deliberate strategy
to bring a painful life peacefully to a close? When does the patient's
control of the palliation allow the patient, technologically, to hasten a
31. SMITH, supra note 6, at 160.
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much desired end to suffering? Should control over end of life decisions
go beyond the current compromises, and if so, what checks and balances
are necessary to prevent unethical conduct by the unscrupulous?
There is probably no one writing today who has a greater insight
into these quandaries and who offers a more assured approach to his
solution than does Professor Smith. The parameters of the problem are
now well-known. The absolutists, once again, are out of harmony with
most ordinary folks. Various solutions are offered for our consideration.
Professor Smith takes us into the often unwelcome contemplation of the
journey that many of us, perhaps most, will eventually take. In every
land, the law must be obeyed. But in the uncertainty of its fuzzy
principles, the law will often lie reasonable and rational solutions,
grounded in the autonomy and dignity of the central actor in the final
drama: the patient approaching "that sleep of death" that Shakespeare
describes in the passage from Hamlet,32 with which Professor Smith
opens this book.
VI
So, this is a work of reflective and beautifully written chapters in a
timely and well-informed book. Its author is undogmatic and always
thoughtful. He portrays a reverence for the human person that is, in a
sense, spiritual. But his basic approach, whilst well informed on
religious doctrine, is humanist, practical, and rational. In that sense, it
is a reflection of the law at its best, as manifested in the United States
and in other countries with like legal traditions. Here is the work of a
master craftsman who has spent a lifetime puzzling over, and writing
upon, these topics. Indiana University can be proud that he is one of its
own. 33 But more than this, he is a scholar who has engaged with
lawyers and ethicists close to home and far away, including in Australia
where he is often an honored guest, admired by legal faculties and
students for his wisdom, expertise, and reflective insights.
Few will read this book without finding some opinion or point of
view with which to disagree. But that is the very nature of this field of
discourse. No one could read the text without closing the last page and
32. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc.
1.
33. See Michael D. Kirby, The New Biology and International Sharing-Lessons from the
Life and Work of George P. Smith, II, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL STUD. 425 (2000); Raymond C.
O'Brien, The World of Law, Science, and Medicine According to George P. Smith, II, 8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 163 (1992) (digging into some of the main themes of
Professor Smith's major law review articles and explaining the recurrent themes in his
scholarship).
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being aware that he has been in presence of a wise and generous spirit.
In the end, for all the doctrine and the formal rules the encyclicals of
Popes and the laws of civilian society, a loving spirit is what is generally
needed to guide human actors to the ethical resolution of the quandaries
of law and bioethics. For that journey, Professor George P. Smith, II,
has now provided a stimulating and most agreeable text as a trusty
companion for us all.
